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ABSTRACT
Central to the vision of the smart grid is the deployment of
smart meters that will allow autonomous software agents,
representing the consumers, to optimise their use of devices
and heating in the smart home while interacting with the
grid. However, without some form of coordination, the pop-
ulation of agents may end up with overly-homogeneous op-
timised consumption patterns that may generate signiﬁcant
peaks in demand in the grid. These peaks, in turn, reduce
the eﬃciency of the overall system, increase carbon emis-
sions, and may even, in the worst case, cause blackouts.
Hence, in this paper, we introduce a novel model of a De-
centralised Demand Side Management (DDSM) mechanism
that allows agents, by adapting the deferment of their loads
based on grid prices, to coordinate in a decentralised man-
ner. Speciﬁcally, using average UK consumption proﬁles for
26M homes, we demonstrate that, through an emergent co-
ordination of the agents, the peak demand of domestic con-
sumers in the grid can be reduced by up to 17% and carbon
emissions by up to 6%. We also show that our DDSM mech-
anism is robust to the increasing electriﬁcation of heating in
UK homes (i.e., it exhibits a similar eﬃciency).
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Computing Methodologies]: Artiﬁcial Intelligence—
Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence
General Terms
Agents, Multi-Agent Systems
Keywords
Energy, Demand-side Management Electricity, Multi-Agent
Systems, Agent-Based Control, Agents.
1. INTRODUCTION
The creation of the Smart Grid has been posed as one of the
greatest challenges of this century, as countries face dwin-
dling non-renewable energy sources and the adverse eﬀects
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of climate change due to carbon emissions [12]. The vision of
a Smart Grid includes technologies that enable the eﬃcient
integration of intermittent renewable energy sources (such
as wind or solar energy) and electric vehicles, and will re-
duce demand by allowing consumers to better manage how
electricity is used, stored, and delivered. One of the key
underpinnings of this endeavour is the concept of the smart
meter which aims to manage the devices in the home to min-
imise ineﬃciencies in usage and maximise the user’s savings.
Smart meters also aim to interact with the grid in order to
help reduce peaks in demand (which would otherwise lead to
instability in the grid, higher energy costs and higher carbon
emissions) and keep up with variable output from wind or
solar energy generators [1]. If these ideal features of smart
metering materialise, they may lead to signiﬁcant reductions
in energy costs and carbon emissions while guaranteeing se-
curity of supply.
To date, smart meters have mainly been designed to act
as information provisioning devices that tend to leave it to
the user to manage devices in the home, with the hope they
will reduce their energy demands. In addition to this, De-
mand Side Management (DSM) technologies have also been
developed to alter the behaviour of users by either charging
them for using electricity at peak hours (potentially leading
to other peaks at cheaper hours) or by inducing the devices,
via the smart meter, to turn oﬀ (or on) when the network
signals them to (either through price signal or the frequency
of AC power) [6, 7].
1 While such DSM techniques have been
shown to bring about signiﬁcant improvements on a small
number of houses, it is unclear how such technologies will
scale when smart meters are rolled out to millions of homes
or buildings nationwide.
2 In particular, the centralised man-
agement of even thousands of smart meters is likely to be
a complex task that may require intruding upon users’ pri-
vacy to cater for all homes, each with its own speciﬁc set of
devices, usage proﬁle, and preferences set by the owner (e.g.,
thermostat settings or times at which she wishes to switch on
energy intensive devices such as washing machines). More-
over, as we show in this paper, simply leaving smart meters
to react to price or frequency ﬂuctuations can cause all de-
vices to respond at the same time (e.g., every user switching
1A change in frequency is caused by unmatched supply and
demand in the grid. Maintaining the frequency of electric-
ity (50Hz in UK) is important because devices running on
AC power such as electric motors in household appliances
are optimised for this frequency and may be damaged if it
deviates too far.
2As per the Climate Change Act of 2008, the UK Govern-
ment has committed to installing smart meters in all of the
26M homes in the UK by 2020 [2].on the air conditioning unit or washing machine at the same
time), thus generating peaks in demand that impact on the
system. Finally, the fact that increasingly more and more
features of the home are likely to be electriﬁed in the future
[3] (e.g., the use of heat pumps for space and water heat-
ing), means that more signiﬁcant peaks may be created due
to the reactive behaviour of the smart meters. Thus, un-
less appropriate control strategies are implemented to allow
smart meters to coordinate, they may well generate greater
peaks in demand than before, leading to a more stressed grid
and, in the worst case, blackouts.
Against this background, in this paper, we develop and
evaluate a model of decentralised demand side management
(DDSM) to coordinate large populations of autonomous agents
representing individual smart meters. In more detail, we
model the smart home as being composed of a number of
deferrable loads (controlled by an agent that optimises the
deferment of these loads so as to maximise the comfort in
the home and minimise energy costs) as well as non-deferable
loads. Moreover, we design mechanisms for agents to adapt
(instead of reacting as in traditional DSM mechanisms) the
deferment of their loads. Thus, this paper advances the
state of the art in the following ways. First, we provide a
model of the smart home where the deferment of loads is op-
timised using mathematical programming techniques. Sec-
ond, we provide motivating examples that illustrate the key
requirements to implement fully decentralised agent-based
control strategies and thereon show that our model of DDSM
meets these requirements. Third, we empirically evaluate
our DDSM mechanism (on a population of 5000 agents) and
show that using DDSM leads to the emergent coordination
of agents (without directly communicating with each other).
Based on the average load proﬁle of 26M UK homes, the
agents converge to an equilibrium where the peak demand
of the domestic consumers is ﬂattened by up to 17% and
carbon emissions are reduced by up to 6%. Furthermore,
using evolutionary game theoretic techniques, we also show
that it is always proﬁtable (i.e., it is a Nash Equilibrium) to
allow agents to control the deferment of devices as the pro-
portion of smart homes in the population increases. Finally,
we demonstrate that our DDSM mechanism would remain
eﬀective even in a future with signiﬁcantly more electriﬁed
heating.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section
2, we review the literature and in Section 3, we describe our
model of the smart home. Section 4 presents the mathemat-
ical programming solutions we propose to the optimisation
problems that may need to be solved by the smart meter.
We present the requirements for implementing the DDSM
and then, our DDSM in Section 5. In Section 6, we em-
pirically evaluate the performance of the DDSM in terms
of its impact on the smart home and the grid performance.
Section 7 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND
Schweppe et al. introduced the concept of DDSM and were
the ﬁrst to propose a design for the smart meter which in-
cluded advanced functions to optimise the schedule of loads,
the prediction of demand in the home, and the prediction
of weather conditions among others [10].
3 While being far
ahead of their time, their work mainly dealt with predicting
3Prior to this, they had provided techniques to (i) control
demand and supply in the network through the use of spot
pricing of electricity [11] (ii) perform demand side manage-
the system behaviour, given the implementation of smart
meters, using closed form solutions that required approxi-
mating and homogenising the behaviours of actors involved
in the system. In contrast, in this paper, we present an
agent-based approach that allows us to model each individ-
ual home in the system and to simulate large numbers of
such homes (potentially in the order of millions given enough
computational resources) in order to analyse system perfor-
mance. In so doing, we are able to establish the incentives of
the users to adopt smart metering technology using agent-
based simulations and evolutionary game theoretic (EGT)
techniques.
Similar to our work is that of Vytelingum et al. [13] who
presented a model of smart meters controlling storage de-
vices in the home and showed how doing so improves the
performance of the system at large. However, they do not
deal with more complex deferrable loads and managing the
comfort in the home, which are key issues in DSM. Hence,
we believe our paper generalises their approach by formal-
ising and evaluating the control mechanism needed to elicit
good equilibria in the system when performing demand side
management.
In addition to these theoretical studies, recent DSM tri-
als by the GridWise Project
4 have shown that market-based
control techniques, where homes respond to real-time pric-
ing (RTP), can reduce peak demand (when prices are high)
to some degree [6, 7]. Theoretical studies of this setting also
predict similar beneﬁts [8]. However, these approaches sim-
plify the behaviour of the devices in the home to reactively
respond to prices rather than predicting and planning use.
This uncoordinated behaviour, in turn, leads to peaks in de-
mand being shifted to periods when the prices are low. In
contrast, in our DDSM, the agents adapt the behaviour of
the devices which allows them to coordinate, in an emergent
fashion, to ﬂatten demand.
3. THE SMART HOME MODEL
In this section we present a model of an agent that optimises
the home’s energy usage by managing loads to maximise
savings while mitigating the impact on the user’s lifestyle
(or comfort). Now, it is important to note that loads can
be classiﬁed into two categories: those that can and those
that cannot be deferred to later times. Examples of the lat-
ter include lighting, entertainment devices, phone charging
and computer usage and of the former, include washing ma-
chines, dishwashers, boilers and fridges. Hence, the agent is
only able to control some of the devices in the home without
impacting too much on the lifestyle of the user. Moreover in
the UK, deferrable loads currently account for around 20%
of the domestic electricity usage and this is likely to grow
with the increased electriﬁcation of space and water heating
[2, 9].
5 Now, if agents are not coordinated in defering these
loads, they may induce higher peaks in the system than
before (as discussed in Section 1). Thus, before proposing
our solution to this, in the following subsections we build a
model of a smart home that is suﬃciently realistic to cap-
ment through market-based exchanges of energy rights to re-
duce peaks in electricity demand [15], and (iii) optimise the
heating module of a building or a set of buildings through
the use of spot pricing.
4See more details at http://gridwise.pnl.gov/.
5Mackay convincingly argues that heat pumps are much
more eﬃcient than (micro) combined heating and power
(CHP) technology that is currently more popular.ture the key eﬀects that we address. In the next subsection,
we elaborate on the types of devices we consider.
3.1 Deferrable Loads
Within the domestic energy domain, it is common to char-
acterise the devices under four speciﬁc categories [5]: (i) wet
(e.g., washing machine or dishwasher), (ii) cold (e.g., fridge
or freezer), (iii) water heating (e.g., boiler or hot water dis-
penser) (iv) space heating (e.g., heat pumps or radiators).
The devices that fall under these diﬀerent categories be-
have very diﬀerently. For example, the wet types usually
involve set periods of time at which they are switched on
and oﬀ either by the user or by the device controller. The
cold, water and space heating devices are much more de-
pendent on the usage and the temperature of the home and
will vary their behaviour depending on various external fac-
tors beyond the control of the user. Hence, we categorise
these diﬀerent loads in terms of those that have precise run-
ning times and running periods, which we call shiftable static
loads (SSLs), and those that are more dependent on the tem-
perature, which we call thermal loads.
6 Given this, in the
next sub-sections, we provide examplar optimisation mod-
els for SSLs and a thermal load. We will consider a typical
domestic proﬁle that spans the usage over a day divided in
half-hourly slots represented by a set of time slots t ∈ T
where T = {1,···,48}. We also assume the smart meter
receives a price signal (which may be ﬁxed) at every time t.
3.2 Shiftable Static Loads
The set of SSLs is noted as l ∈ L where each load is charac-
terised by a set of parameters. Thus, ol ⊆ T is a set of time
slots at which the device is set by the user to turn on. In ef-
fect, ol represents the preferred time at which the user would
like to switch on the device (e.g., switch on the washing ma-
chine while she is away). Any deviation from this preset
time is likely to cause a loss of comfort to the user. Let
dl ∈{ − 24,−23,···,23,24} be the deferment of the device
and note rl ∈ R
+ as the power rating of the device in kW.
The duration v
l (in time slots) of each load is drawn from a
uniform distribution, U(v
l
min,v
l
max)w h e r ev
l
min,v
l
max ∈ T
will depend on the device used (e.g., a washing machine typ-
ically runs between 1 and 3 hours). To model the eﬀect of
shifting loads from their preset time, let Δcl ∈ R
+ be the
marginal comfort cost associated with deferring the device
to a diﬀerent time from those initially set in ol. Then, the
overall comfort cost is cl =Δ cl|dl|. This assumes that the
more the smart meter deviates from the time at which the
user initially sets a device to run, the more discomfort it
will cause to the user.
7 The key variable in our optimisa-
tion model is eﬀectively dl since it determines the power
consumption (which, in turn, determines the price paid by
the user) and comfort cost of the user. Given a price pt (in
£/kWh), ∀t ∈ T, the objective is then to minimise the cost
and comfort cost, as follows:
min
dl∀l∈L
 
l∈L σcl +
 
t∈T
 
l∈L γ
l
trlptv
l0
such that γ
l
t =
 
1 ,t= t
  + dl
0 ,otherwise ,
where t
  ∈ ol
(1)
6It is possible to cast cold loads such as small fridges under
SSLs if, for example, it is only required for the fridge to keep
its contents well below room temperature (instead of a set
temperature) by turning it on and oﬀ at regular intervals).
7Of course, more complex functions could be built by the
user, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
such that γ
l
t ∈{ 0,1} determines when the devices is turned
on or oﬀ (based on the shifting of the on times ol by dl),
vl is a number of time slots over which device l is on, and
σ ∈ [0,1] is a scaling factor determining how much comfort
is more important to the user relative to price. Using the
above mathematical programming formulation, the optimi-
sation problem of ﬁnding the optimal deferment of SSLs be
therefore be directly solved using standard solvers.
3.3 Thermal Loads
We now turn to modelling the thermal properties of the
home and the use of a heater controlled by an intelligent
adaptive thermostat controlled by the smart meter.
8 Stan-
dard adaptive thermostats warm up the house to be at the
required temperature exactly when the user expects to be
home. By turning on the heating before the user is present,
the thermostat ensures the house is always warm when the
user requires it to be. An intelligent adaptive thermostat, in
turn, aims to optimise the heating (or cooling) proﬁle (i.e.,
times at which the heater is turned on), in order to guar-
antee the required temperature is reached at the time the
user is present and that the costs of doing so are minimised.
To this end, we specify the properties of our heating opti-
misation model as follows. First, we detail the properties of
t h eh o m ea n dt h eh e a t e r . T h eh e a t e rw ec h o o s et om o d e l
is a heat pump (either air-source or ground-source) which
simply extracts heat from one place and moves it to another
place [9]. Second, we provide a mixed-integer quadratic pro-
gramming (MIQP) formulation of the problem which can be
solved using oﬀ-the-shelf solvers.
9
3.3.1 Home and Heater Properties
To model and simulate the thermal properties of the home
and heater, we build upon the models proposed by [4] which
use the ASHRAE model of comfort.
10 Let φ ∈ R
+ be the
thermal leakage rate of the house measured in W/K. The
internal temperature of the home at time t is τ
t
in ∈ R
+ and
the external temperature (in K) is denoted as τ
t
ext ∈ R
+.
The user will set the temperature τopt ∈ R
+ at the level
she feels comfortable (typically 22.5 degrees Celcius). The
heat capacity and the total mass of air in the home are
denoted as ahc ∈ R
+ (in J/kg/K) and amass ∈ R
+ (in kg)
(which is computed using the air density and house volume)
respectively. The heater is described by rh and oh where
rh ∈ R
+ is the power rating (in kW) of the heater and oh ⊆
T is a set of time slots at which the heat pump is switched
on. Given this, we also deﬁne the variable h
t
on ∈{ 0,1} for
every t ∈ T where h
t
on =1i ft ∈ oh and 0 otherwise. This
description of the heater is similar to the deferrable loads
above except that the deferment of the heater is much more
c o m p l e xa sw ew i l ls e en e x t .F o rn o w ,w ec a nc o m p u t et h e
total heat input in the system as:
η
t
i = h
t−1
on rh − φ(τ
t−1
in − τ
t−1
ext )( 2 )
Moreover, we can deﬁne the relationship between the inside
temperature at time t and the amount of heat injected in
8The model also applies to cooling eﬀects simply by setting
the parameters diﬀerently to model heat extraction rather
than heat injection as we do here.
9We use IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.2 in our experiments.
10American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and
Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) Standard 55-
2010:Thermal environmental conditions for human occu-
pancy.the house at time t − 1a s :
τ
t
in = τ
t−1
in +
kη
t
i
ahcamass
(3)
where k =
24×3600
|T| is the time (in seconds) during which the
heater is on.
11
Now, we expect users to set the times at which they will
be at home and will want the temperature adjusted for their
comfort. To this end, we deﬁne comfort on times as a C
t
on ∈
{0,1} at every time slot t ∈ T such that the C
t
on =1i ft h e
user needs comfort and C
t
on = 0 otherwise. During every
time slot, we model the instantaneous comfort cost (i.e.,
ignoring changes from the previous time slot) of the user
due to heating as Δc
t
h ∈ R
+ such that:
Δc
t
h =
 
C
t
onω1(τ
t
in − τopt)
2,τ
t
in ≥ τopt
C
t
onω2(τ
t
in − τopt)
2,τ
t
in <τ opt
 
(4)
where ω1,ω 2 ∈ [0,1] are constants that scale the eﬀect of the
temperature diﬀerence depending on whether it is more (or
less) comfortable when the temperature is higher or lower
than topt (in degrees celcius). Typically, in colder periods,
ω1 <ω 2 is preferred. Then, the total comfort cost at time t
is a combination of the present instantaneous comfort cost
and at t − 1g i v e nb y :
c
t
h =Δ c
t
h + γΔc
t−1
h (5)
where γ ∈ [0,1] scales the eﬀect of the previous time slot on
the current one (and captures the psychological persistence
of discomfort).
3.3.2 MIQP Formulation
Given the times when C
t
on = 1 and the comfort cost c
t
h,t h e
goal of the agent is to optimise the heating so as to minimise
the price paid by the user. Thus, assuming the price of elec-
tricity at every time t is pt, and specifying h
t
on ∈{ 0,1},∀t ∈
T as the decision variables, the objective function of the
program is:
min
ht
on∀t∈T
 
t∈T
c
t
h + κ(v
hh
t
onrhpt)( 6 )
subject to (2),(3), and (4), where κ ∈ [0,1] balances the
cost of heating against the comfort and v
h = 1800s is the
duration of one time slot in seconds (assuming each time the
heater is turned on for a half-hour). The quadratic nature of
the objective function arises as a result of the computation
of the comfort cost in (4). We set κ to a very small value to
ensure that this part of the objective function only ensures
that the user mainly optimises her comfort. Now, in some
cases, a budget can be set by the user according to how
much she can aﬀord to spend on a daily basis for heating
purposes. Thus, in order to ensure that the cost is never
higher than a set value p
  ∈ R
+, we also add the following
constraint to the model:
 
t∈T
v
hh
t
onrhpt ≤ p
  (7)
Since agents are only intent on maximising their gains
(in comfort and cost savings), their aggregated uncoordi-
nated behaviour may result in poor system performance un-
less demand-side management mechanisms are put in place.
11In our experiments, we reﬁne the resolution to smaller time
slots (e.g., of 5 or 10 minutes) to get a better measure of the
temperature inside the room.
Hence, given our model of the smart home, in the next sec-
tion, we ﬁrst describe the optimal and centralised solution
that maximises social welfare (and describes what optimal
means in this context) that determines the optimal coor-
dinated behaviour of the agents. By so doing, we can use
this as a benchmark for any control mechanism that can
be developed in this domain (which we use to evaluate our
mechanism in Section 6.
4. MAXIMISING SOCIAL WELFARE
As a result of the individual agents’ deferment of loads, the
consumption of energy at diﬀerent times of the day may
signiﬁcantly increase or decrease, resulting in price spikes in
the system. Before going on to design a control mechanism
to reduce this eﬀect, however, we need to determine the
optimal performance of the population of agents as a whole
to evaluate our control mechanism (see Section 6).
As was shown in [13], when agents attempt to defer con-
sumption (in their case, they used storage), a game theo-
retic analysis of the problem predicts that the agents should
converge to the competitive equilibrium. This means that
they converge to an equilibrium (ﬂat) price for electricity
if there is enough storage, at which point social welfare is
maximised.
In the context of deferrable loads, such an analysis is sig-
niﬁcantly more complex as shiftable static loads, comfort
costs, and thermal loads are not homogeneous across the
population of agents. Instead, we can compute the point at
which all agents behave optimally by aligning their individ-
ual objective functions with the global optimum as follows.
First, we assume that each agent i ∈ I,w h e r eI is the set of
agents, has a non-shiftable static load lfixed such as light-
ing, cooking and other types of essential loads which have a
power rating fixedt,i ∈ R
+ in kW at every time point t ∈ T.
Second, we assume that the cost of electricity for the pop-
ulation is given by a quadratic cost function (the function
is assumed to be quadratic to mimic an increasing marginal
cost for electricity supply – we use such a model in our evalu-
ation) st : R
+ → R
+ for every time slot t such as st(q)=θq
2
where θ>0. This means that the greater the demand from
the agents, the higher will be the unit price of electricity
(because of the monotonically increasing function). Then,
we aggregate the functions in equations (1) and (6) subject
to the individual constraints as stated in Equations (2), (3)
and (5) and the conditions stated in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.1
as follows:
min
ht
on,i∀t∈T,di
l∀l∈Li
 
i∈I
⎛
⎜
⎝
 
t∈T c
t
h,i +
 
l∈Li σcl,i
+
 
t∈T st
  
l∈Li γ
l
t,irl,iv
l
i
+κiv
h
i h
t
on,irh,i + fixedt,i
 
⎞
⎟
⎠
(8)
The main diﬀerence between the above objective and the
individual agents’ objective is that the cost of electricity in
the above case is based on the induced cost as a result of
the agents’ aggregated demand (both from their deferrable
loads and their static demand) using the supply function
s(·) rather than the cost predicted by the agents pt (which
is assumed to be a ﬁxed unit cost).
Note that the optimal algorithm above is unlikely to scale
very well in the number of loads per agent and deferabil-
ity of these loads given the complexity of the optimisation
problem and given non-linearity of the objective function.
Speciﬁcally, experiments (where Equation (4) is linearised)
using a standard MIQP solver (e.g., IBM ILOG CPLEX12.2) could be run for up to 75 agents with up to three
deferrable loads each (on a 64-bit machine with 12GB of
RAM). Beyond this size, the solver cannot model the prob-
lem in memory. This would be ﬁne for scenarios where a cen-
tral controller has complete control over the few deferrable
loads in a building for example, it will clearly not scale to
hundreds of houses (where users might not want the cen-
tral controller to override their preferences to use electric-
ity) or for deferrable loads (and certainly not to all 26M UK
homes).
Hence, in the next section, we discuss some of main is-
sues in DSM and introduce a novel approach to tackling
this problem in a completely decentralised fashion.
5. DECENTRALISED DEMAND-SIDEMAN-
AGEMENT
Most DSM approaches involve a central controller that ad-
vises a pool of consumers to reduce their current demand
(during peak demands), often by reducing or deferring loads
subject to economic incentives. This approach has repeat-
edly been shown to be eﬀective for relatively small pool
sizes of industrial and commercial consumers [6]. Indeed,
it constitutes the business model of a number of energy
service companies (ESCOs) that exclusively deal with De-
mand Side Management (e.g., EnergyConnect Inc. and En-
erNOC). While it remains feasible to signal a small number
of consumers and expect an immediate response, DSM at
a regional or national level (with 26M of households in the
UK) is more complex. Given this, in the next subsections,
we discuss the main issues associated with applying DSM on
a large scale (dealing with thousands and millions of homes).
First, we justify the need for a price signal to incentivise the
agents to defer their demand. Second, we show that, even
if an accurate price signal is provided according to the cri-
teria we propose, the adaptive and autonomous behaviour
of the agents in the system is the key component that can
enable signiﬁcant performance beneﬁts in the Smart Grid.
Thus, we propose a novel model of decentralised demand
side management (DDSM).
5.1 The Pricing Mechanism
The pricing mechanism that we propose involves signalling
the costs of generating electricity to the consumers. Tradi-
tionally, consumers are oﬀered a ﬁxed price for electricity by
their supplier. Exceptions to this include time-of-use (TOU)
pricing (e.g., Economy 7 heating or eco:2020 in the UK)
and real-time pricing (RTP) schemes. While ﬁxed pricing
mechanisms completely hide the real-time costs of electricity
(which varies according to the type of generators used and
availability of intermittent renewable energy), TOU pricing
simply biases the real price of electricity in order to incen-
tivise users (who typically aim to maximise their savings)
to shift their loads to oﬀ-peak periods (i.e., when aggregate
demand is lower). In contrast, RTP involves providing a
price signal for the next 30 minutes time slot at the current
time. While RTP is still being evaluated in a number of
trials, it has been shown to be better than TOU pricing in
allowing users to dynamically adjust their demand to avoid
peaks when electricity is more expensive [6, 7].
To understand the eﬀect of the diﬀerent pricing schemes
on demand, consider Figure 1 where we show how 500 smart
homes
12 (as described earlier) would react to the three dif-
12We implemented each smart home according to the settings
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Figure 1: Demand optimisation given the Domestic
Economy 7 tariﬀ and the 30-min-tariﬀ pricing mod-
els.
ferent types of pricing mechanisms (where real time prices
are provided for 30-minute time slots). As expected, a ﬁxed
price induces a relatively high demand with large plateaus
in the morning and evening (when users are at home and
typically use their loads) since users are indiﬀerent about
the real-time costs of generating electricity. More impor-
tantly, we can observe that when all the consumers are on
a two-tariﬀ mechanism, they optimise their demand at the
same time (to take opportunity of oﬀ-peak prices), and thus
the ensuing demand on the grid now peaks during oﬀ-peak
times. Similarly, it can be seen that the RTP mechanism
also shifts demand to diﬀerent times of the day and induces
other peaks at these times.
These results show that a more accurate signal (i.e., repre-
senting real costs) allows consumers to better optimise their
demand by reacting more often to a more accurate 30-min-
tariﬀ pricing model. However, it is also clear that the de-
mand cannot be ﬂattened by applying only aR T Pm e c h a -
nism, while completely ignoring the behaviour of the agents.
This is because if the agents are signalled a low price for the
next 30-minute period, they will all switch on their devices,
which then results in a peak in demand at the next time
period. When such a mechanism is rolled out on a large
scale, such reactive behaviours can cause signiﬁcant peaks.
To remedy this, in the next sub-section, we propose a novel
adaptive behaviour for the agents, which builds upon the
RTP mechanism, to allow agents, without any centralised
control, to coordinate in our DDSM model.
5.2 The Adaptive Mechanism
Our adaptive mechanism for DDSM is composed of algo-
rithms that determine how to defer the two diﬀerent types
of deferrable loads present in the home (i.e., shiftable static
loads and thermal loads) and how to optimise heating. First,
we adopt the Widrow-Hoﬀ learning mechanism [13] to grad-
ually adapt how agents defer their deferrable loads based on
predicted market prices for the next day
13 (as opposed to the
next 30 minutes as in [6, 7]). Speciﬁcally, an agent i gradu-
given in the evaluation section.
13We use a weighted moving average to predict day-ahead
market prices, but more sophisticated approaches incorpo-
rating domain-speciﬁc knowledge could easily be used.ally adapts its deferment parameter d
i
l towards the optimal
d
i,∗
l (as computed by the objective function in Equation (1))
as follows:
d
i
l(t +1 )=d
i
l(t)+β
i(d
i,∗
l − d
i
l(t))
where β
i ∈ (0,1] deﬁnes the learning rate (i.e. how fast the
agent reacts to changing conditions).
Second, each agent’s behaviour is further modelled by how
often it readjusts its heating proﬁle. Speciﬁcally, it reopti-
mises its thermal load proﬁle on any particular day, with
a probability of α ∈ (0,1). This means, it reruns the op-
timisation detailed in Section 3.3.2 with a probability of α
according to the predicted prices pt for the next day. The
expected number of agents that will optimise on any par-
ticular day is thus given by Nα,w h e r eN is the number of
agents with DSM capability. By so doing, we introduce iner-
tia into the optimisation by ensuring that all DSM-capable
agents do not reoptimse at the same time and, in the next
section, we empirically demonstrate that a stable and desir-
able outcome is reached whereby grid demand ﬂattens when
α and β are suﬃciently small. Moreover, we also show that
the agents’ best strategy (proﬁt maximising) is to adopt an
adaptive behaviour. Thus, even though consumers are not
centrally coordinated for DSM, our mechanism ensures an
eﬀective emergent coordination among consumers.
In general, our DDSM mechanism can be particularly at-
tractive when dealing with millions of consumers since it
does not require, apart from the price signal (which could
be directly sent to the smart meter), any other form of direct
communication between the generators and the consumers.
Moreover, the adaptive mechanism can also be modelled for
diﬀerent types of consumers as discussed above. Thus, when
large populations of such consumers are simulated within
a smart grid, it is possible, with reasonable accuracy, to
predict the behaviour of the system. To this end, in the
next section, we provide simulations of populations of smart
homes (extrapolated across the grid
14) and evaluate the per-
formance of our DDSM both in terms of the consumers’ ben-
eﬁts and the grid performance. In so doing, we aim to show
how our DDSM mechanism generally aligns the incentives
of the users with the system-wide objectives, leading to a
more eﬃcient and stable Smart Grid.
6. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In our experiments we consider a population of 5000 agents
15
and a RTP pricing based on the macro-model of the UK
electricity market (as outlined by Vytelingum et al. [13]),
with a quadratically increasing marginal cost. We used, for
the shiftable static loads and thermal loads, data compiled
by the Department of Trade and Industry in the UK from
2008.
16 This dataset shows that, while shiftable static loads
14We use a similar methodology to [13] based on real UK
Grid demand and market prices and average UK domestic
load proﬁles for a typical weekday in winter.
15The time taken to run our simulations grows linearly with
the number of agents and we have conﬁrmed similar results
with populations of up to 10,000 agents. However, when
we compare to the optimal solution, we are limited to 75
agents, due to the computational complexity of the solution.
Hence, to approximate the optimal solution for 5000 agents,
we ran the global optimisation in Equation (8) 100 times for
n u m b e r so fa g e n t sf r o m5 0t o7 5a n de s t i m a t e dt h eo p t i m a l
solution for 5000 agents from the trend identiﬁed.
16http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file11250.pdf on 20/10/2010.
(e.g., wet loads such as washing machines and dryers) are
owned by nearly the whole population, the penetration of
electrical heating is currently only around 7%. Moreover,
shiftable static loads take up on average 20% of the total
energy usage of a house while the rest of the consumption is
due to entertainment, lighting, and cooking purposes. This
setup is likely to change in the future because of a growing
need to use more eﬃcient heating devices such as heat pumps
such that the load proﬁle is likely to change signiﬁcantly.
Given this, in this section, we also aim to show the ef-
fects of increased deferment of electriﬁed thermal load, on
the smart grid. To this end, we create instances of the smart
home with parameters set according the dataset above. We
model two wet shiftable static loads (dryer and washing ma-
chine) with power rating of 2kW each as well as a thermal
load (with τopt= 22.5, ac = 1000, amass ∈ [1000,2000], and
rh = 2kW). In order to generate the speciﬁed ON times for
the shiftable static loads, we use the average load proﬁle as a
probability density function (i.e., describing the probability
of the device being set to be switched on by the user at each
half-hour period) and use a Poisson distribution Pois(λ)t o
generate the number of times the devices are switched on in
ad a y( w i t hλ = 2). Moreover, we generate τext as the aver-
age 5 minutes temperature readings taken over a period of 5
days from the roof-top sensor at one of our university build-
ings in January 2010 (during the cold season). Wherever
needed, we adjust the number of agents having electriﬁed
heating (i.e., starting with the current 7%). Our experi-
ments are repeated 100 times and the results averaged and
error bars plotted to represent the 95% conﬁdence intervals.
6.1 Performance of the Adaptive Mechanism
First, we evaluate the eﬃciency of our mechanism. We do
so by comparing the eﬃciency of the grid when using our
DDSM mechanism as opposed to a centralised system with
complete and perfect information against an optimal be-
haviour. Given our optimal solution (described in Section 4)
with an optimal load factor
17 (LF) of 0.76, we can observe
that a DDSM-based grid behaviour converges to the optimal
behaviour (up from LF=0.6) when α is reasonably small as
shown in Figure 2(a). While higher values may give faster
convergence to the optimal, they do not allow the system
to settle at a more eﬃcient equilibrium (i.e. closer to the
optimal). Furthermore, when α is too large, there is no con-
vergence as too many agents are reoptimising at the same
time such that the peaks are simply moved rather than ﬂat-
tened. When α = 1 and every user optimises at the same
time, the system breaks down (with an LF averaging 0.55).
Thus, as we empirically showed, the system converges to
the optimal behaviour without any centralised coordination
when α is reasonably small. Speciﬁcally, for the rest of our
experiments, we set α =0 .05.
6.2 Emergent Behaviour of the Smart Grid
Given our DDSM approach with its adaptive mechanism,
we ﬁrst empirically demonstrate in Figure 2(b) that as the
load factor of domestic consumers converges to the optimal
load factor at 0.76 (meaning fewer peaks in the system), the
17The load factor is the ratio of average power to peak power
and is ideally 1. A low load factor suggests large peaks
in demand. Here we computed the load factor based on
our estimation of the optimal solution as discussed in the
previous section. We validated our results on small numbers
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Figure 2: Evaluating DDSM in the Smart Grid w.r.t. (a) learning rates, (b) Load Factor & CO2 emissions.
percentage of carbon reduction also increases up to 6% (i.e.,
electricity is produced from less polluting sources) as fewer
carbon intensive peaking plants are used.
Next, we analyse the system by considering the load du-
ration curve (LDC) of the grid. The LDC
18 is used to illus-
trate the relationship between generating capacity require-
ments and capacity utilization, normalised to the current
domestic load demand in UK. Figure 3 shows the LDC of
the system (based on today’s 7% electriﬁcation of heating)
and, speciﬁcally, we can observe that particularly within the
peak-load region (which is from 100% to 80%), the curve ﬂat-
tens when optimised, which implies a ﬂattening of demand
peaks. Furthermore, at 100% peak demand, we observe that
the domestic load decreases by up to 17%, compared to the
unoptimised case, which implies that the grid requires 17%
less capacity to cope with domestic demand. Considering
that current domestic peak demand is in excess of 15 GW,
a 17% reduction in capacity requirement is signiﬁcant and
will become increasingly vital given the high rate of increase
of domestic peak demand.
Next, we analyse the population dynamics to evaluate
whether users will be incentivised to automate their smart
meters (i.e., to give control to an agent). Speciﬁcally, we use
evolutionary game theory (EGT) techniques which allow us
to determine whether diﬀerent proportions of the population
will adopt smart meters (or not) depending on how much
they can save by doing so. First, we formulate the problem
as a complex non-deterministic game where agents have a
mixed strategy xr ∈ (0,1), i.e. a probability that they have
DDSM capability and are only motivated by ﬁnancial gains,
where r ∈ S = {DDSM,¬DDSM}. By analysing how xr
changes as the payoﬀs of agents with and without DDSM
change for diﬀerent xr (assuming agents are more likely to
18The load duration curve is computed as follows. Let   be a
vector of load values of the system at diﬀerent time slots and
 
∗ be the ordered version (from high to low) of  . The load
duration curve is then given as (f(x) ∈ X = { 
∗
1,..., 
∗
M} :
x ∈ T
+ = {T
+
1 ,...,T
+
M}), where T
+
i =
 M
j=i tj and tj is the
time slot of the j
th ordered load value. The left-hand side
represents the peak loads of the system. The LDC is a useful
way of breaking down the load factor value to describe how
long peaks last for. The domestic capacity (peak load) is
given at 100% load duration.
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Figure 3: Load Duration Curve of Domestic Con-
sumers with today’s 7% electriﬁcation.
adopt the better strategy – whether or not to adopt smart
metering), we aim to analyse how the proportion of the pop-
ulation adopting smart meters and DDSM evolves using the
following equations [14]:
˙ xr =[ u(e
r,x) − u(x,x)]xr where u(x,x)=
 
r∈S
u(e
r,x)xr
xnash =a r g m i n
x∈(0,1)
 
r∈S
(max[u(e
r,x) − u(x,x),0])
2
where u(x,x) is the expected payoﬀ of any agent (whether
using DDSM or not), u(e
r,x) is the expected payoﬀ of an
agent with DDSM given a proportion of the population with
DDSM of xr and, ﬁnally, xnash is the Nash Equilibrium of
the system (i.e., xr where there are no incentive for an agent
to deviate from). Figure 4 shows the payoﬀs of agents with
and without DDSM. Based on our EGT analysis, we deduce
that there is always an incentive for an agent to adopt DDSM
given the higher payoﬀs for any xr, such that ˙ xr is always
positive. The population dynamics eventually converges to
the Nash Equilibrium, xnash = 1. This implies that all
agents eventually adopt smart meters and DDSM.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
Proportion of population with smart meters
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
S
a
v
i
n
g
s
 
(
%
)
 
 
With smart meters Without smart meters
Figure 4: Percentage savings of agents with and
without DDSM for diﬀerent proportions of the pop-
ulation adopting smart meters and DDSM.
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Figure 5: Load Duration Curve of Domestic Con-
sumers with 25% electriﬁcation.
6.3 The Effect of Electrical Heating
Finally, we analyse future scenarios where the proportion
of smart homes with thermal loads might increase. Speciﬁ-
cally, Figure 5 shows grid performance for a potential future
of 25% electriﬁcation. Thus, if the number of smart homes
with thermal loads were to increase from 7% to 25%, the de-
mands would be much higher (by up to 31% – based on ini-
tial loads from Figure 3), with higher peaks. Using DDSM,
we demonstrate that these peaks would again be ﬂattened
signiﬁcantly (shown by the signiﬁcant drop in the 100% to
80%-peak region) using our novel model of a DDSM, with a
22% decrease in peak domestic capacity.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have provided a model of a smart home and
presented our DDSM; a novel paradigm for mechanisms to
manage demand on a large scale in the smart grid. Through
our simulations involving 5000 homes and using average
(winter) load proﬁles for 26M homes in the UK, we have
shown that our DDSM mechanism can improve grid per-
formance by reducing peaks in demand by up to 17% and
carbon emissions by up to 6%. We have also predicted, using
evolutionary game theoretic techniques, that consumers will
have signiﬁcant economic incentives to adopt agent-based
smart meters and will eventually all do so. Finally, we have
shown that DDSM also reduces peaks as demand grows as a
result of increased electriﬁed heating. Future work will look
at integrating price and weather predictions for more eﬀec-
tive DDSM mechanisms and extending these mechanisms
for commercial and industrial consumers in the smart grid.
We also aim to evaluate our mechanism in scenarios where
not all buildings are equipped with agents that can optimise
their behaviour and remain insensitive to real-time prices as
it is at present.
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